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Fluctuations in the volume and the value of financial remittances received from abroad affect 
the livelihood of households in developing economies across the world. Yet, political 
scientists have little to say about how changes in remittances, as opposed to the receipt of 
remittance payments alone, affect recipients’ political attitudes. Relying on a unique four-
wave panel study of Kyrgyz citizens between 2010-2013 and a cross-sectional sample of 28 
countries in Central Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia, we show that when 
people experience a decrease (increase) in remittances, they become less (more) satisfied 
about their household economic situation and misattribute responsibility to the incumbent at 
home. Our findings advance the literature on the political consequences of remittance 
payments and suggest that far from exclusively being an international risk-sharing 
mechanism for developing countries, remittances can also drive fluctuations in incumbent 
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Introduction 
 
For developing world economies, financial remittances, in the form of private-to-private 
income transfers sent by a family member abroad to a relative in their country of origin, are 
now a major source of capital. In 2015 alone, worldwide remittances exceeded 601 billion 
US Dollars and of that amount, 441 billion went to developing countries (Ratha et al. 2016). 
This is a sum equivalent to three times the size of all global aid flows. Development 
economists have long been interested in the economic impact of these income transfers. 
Although a contentious debate exists about the relationship between remittances and 
economic growth (e.g. Page and Plaza 2006), many economists have suggested that 
remittances act as an important international risk-sharing mechanism (e.g. Yang and Choi 
2007). This perspective however, is largely based on the assumption that remittance 
payments either remain stable over time, or that they increase in response to negative shocks 
in migrant sending economies. But what happens if remittance flows suddenly change? How 
do fluctuations in remittances influence the political attitudes of recipients?  
In this study, we explore how fluctuations in remitted income affect support for the 
incumbent in remittance-receiving countries. Building on a small number of studies that have 
linked remittances to economic voting (Bravo 2012; Germano 2013; Ahmed 2017) and recent 
work on competence misattribution in developing countries (Campello and Zucco 2016), we 
contend that changes in remittances influence economic assessments and incumbent approval 
in recipient countries. Specifically, we expect that when remittance inflows increase, 
economic evaluations and incumbent approval will also increase, but when these payments 
decline, recipients will punish incumbents. Our argument echoes recent work in economic 
voting that highlights the importance of pocketbook assessments for incumbent approval (e.g. 
Manacorda et al. 2011; Pop-Eleches and Pop-Eleches 2012). By relying on their pocketbooks 
to inform their evaluations of government performance however, remittance recipients may 
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be rewarding or punishing incumbents at home for economic developments abroad, in 
remittance sending economies, that are largely outside of the incumbent’s control.  
We are able to test these expectations by leveraging a unique four-wave panel study 
of Kyrgyz citizens between 2010-2013 that allows us to carefully identify how fluctuations in 
remittances influence economic assessments and incumbent approval in Kyrgyzstan (Life in 
Kyrgyzstan, LiK). An additional instrumental variable estimation allows us to address 
concerns about endogeneity. We bolster the external validity of our findings by 
supplementing our analyses with cross-national data from 28 countries in Central Eastern 
Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia covered in the 2010 European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (ERBD) Life in Transition surveys (LiTS). The results of 
our analyses strongly support our main theoretical contention; they establish a robust link 
between fluctuations in remittances, economic assessments and incumbent approval.  
Our findings have a number of important implications. Firstly, while a large literature 
on the economic ramifications of remittances exists, there is very little work on the political 
dynamics of these capital inflows. Having said that, some recent work has begun to explore 
the political effects of remittances at the national level (Abdih et al. 2012, Tyburski 2012; 
Aparicio and Meseguer 2012; Pfutze 2014, O’Mahony 2013; Ahmed 2012, Escribà-Folch et 
al. 2015; Chaudhry 1997; Singer 2012; Doyle 2015; Leblang 2017), but we still only have a 
small number of studies that explore the effect of financial remittances on individual-level 
political attitudes and behavior (Meseguer et al. 2016; Germano 2013, Bravo 2012). While 
some of this work has connected remittances to economic voting (Bravo 2012; Germano 
2013; Ahmed 2017), only the work of Acevedo (2016) has considered, although not 
explicitly tested, how fluctuations in remitted income might affect the political attitudes of 
recipients with regard to demand for welfare. No work in political science has yet examined 
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how fluctuations in remittance inflows might affect recipients’ political attitudes in general, 
and support for incumbents in particular.  
This paper is also relevant for work on economic voting (e.g. Kramer 1971, Fiorina 
1981) and competence misattribution in developed and developing countries (e.g. Duch and 
Stevenson 2008; Healy, et al. 2010). While some evidence suggests that voters in Europe can 
disentangle competence from exogenous shocks, i.e. events largely outside of the control of 
incumbents (Duch and Stevenson 2008), recent work has challenged this assumption for low-
information, developing country contexts (Campello and Zucco 2016). Traditional accounts 
of economic voting conclude that rational voters should only sanction the incumbent when 
economic performance is the product of government competence (e.g. Duch and Stevenson 
2008). Yet in developing countries, where party systems are often weak and party labels have 
little meaning (Lupu 2016), economic outcomes and assessments, even if largely driven by 
exogenous factors, may be the only signal or source of information about incumbent 
competence that voters have and may serve as the basis for a calculated economic vote 
(Campello and Zucco 2017).  
Rewarding or punishing incumbents for developments abroad may be a rational 
strategy for voters, especially in developing economies characterized by high volatility and 
paucity of information. Accountability mechanisms however, which are often rudimentary in 
these contexts, could erode even further as a result; it constitutes a form of competence 
misattribution (see Campello and Zucco 2017). For electoral accountability to function 
properly, voters need to reward, or punish, incumbents for outcomes for which they are 
primarily responsible (Kayser and Peress 2012). In many ways, investigating whether voters 
update their incumbent evaluations in response to fluctuations in remittances provides an 
excellent test of the misattribution mechanism. Existing research argues that remittances are 
largely outside of the control of governments in migrant home countries (Bravo 2016) and 
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when incumbent popularity is shaped by remittance inflows from abroad, this may be a 
political manifestation of economic dependency (e.g. Wibbels 2006). 
 We proceed as follows. The next section discusses existing research on the political 
consequences of remittances, before presenting the main argument of our work. We then 
introduce our case selection, data and analysis of the LiK panel data, and LiTS cross-
sectional surveys. The final section concludes.  
 
The Political Consequences of Remittances  
Development economists have long been concerned with the economic effects of remittances. 
Their work highlights the role of remittances in reducing poverty, illiteracy and infant 
mortality ( for an overview, see Fajnzylber et al. 2008). There is also a well-documented 
debate about the effect of remittances on economic growth in developing economies (e.g. 
Page and Plaza 2006). Very little work however, has explored the political effects of 
remittances. We have a vast literature on the political consequences of immigration in 
migrant receiving states (e.g. Cornelius and Rosenbulm 2005), but know very little about 
the political effects that remittances might exert on the countries or individuals that receive 
them.  
Nonetheless, in recent years, a number of studies have begun to explore the effect of 
remittances and migration on the politics of remittance receiving, and migrant sending, states. 
This work has demonstrated that remittances can affect exchange rate policy (Singer 2010), 
dual citizenship requirements (Leblang 2017), and public accountability (Abdih et al. 2012; 
Tyburski 2012; Aparicio and Meseguer 2012), together with the linkage strategies adopted by 
political parties, notably clientelism (Pfutze 2014; O’Mahony 2013). Evidence suggests that 
remittances can prolong (Ahmed 2012) and hinder (Escribà-Folch et al. 2015) the survival of 
autocratic regimes and they can also shape the level, and type, of government expenditures 
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(Chaudhry 1997; Ahmed 2012; Singer 2012; Doyle 2015). The majority of this work is at the 
macro-level.  
There are only a few exceptions to this general trend. A number of studies have 
explored the effect of social remittances, that is, the norms and ideas that migrants observe in 
their host country and transmit to family members in their country of origin, on individual 
level political behavior and preferences (e.g. Levitt 2001). This work suggests that social 
remittances can lead to higher rates of non-electoral political participation and more critical 
evaluations of democracy (Pérez-Armendáriaz and Crow 2010), higher rates of political 
activity and political interest (Córdova and Hiskey 2015) and support for a more enhanced 
role for the state (Meseguer et al. 2016).  
Less work studies the effect of financial remittances on the political behavior and 
attitudes of those that receive them. Given the scale of these transfers, in some contexts they 
can be as large as the national median income, and given that they are generally untaxed and 
go directly into the hands of the individuals that receive them, this would seem to be an 
oversight, particularly as we now know how important personal economic evaluations can be 
for electoral behavior (Kramer 1971; Fiorina 1981; Duch and Stevenson 2008). While Doyle 
(2015), Meseguer et al. (2016) and Acevedo (2016) have examined the effect of financial 
remittances on individual attitudes towards taxation and the state, only three authors have 
explicitly linked the receipt of financial remittances with the economic vote.   
In the first study of this kind, Germano (2010) demonstrated that remittance recipients 
in Mexican municipalities, due to the transnational social safety net effect of remittances, are 
less likely to identify the economy as a pressing problem relative to non-recipients and to 
have fewer economic grievances. Consequently, the more positive egocentric and sociotropic 
outlook of remittance recipients means that they are less likely to oppose incumbent 
politicians (e.g. Germano 2013). In a similar vein, Bravo (2012) has demonstrated that in 
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Latin American countries, financial remittances positively influence presidential approval 
amongst recipients and that this effect operates through more favorable egocentric and 
sociotropic evaluations of the economic situation. Ahmed (2017), again for a Latin American 
sample, has demonstrated that at high levels of dissatisfaction with the incumbent, a 
remittance recipient is more likely to vote for that incumbent, relative to a non-recipient. 
What is particularly interesting about these studies is the fact that, as Bravo (2012) has 
suggested, remittances are an exogenous capital flow, over which the incumbent government, 
in most situations, has little control. In this work, remittances appear to be operating through 
a mechanism consistent with pocketbook voting effects. It is from these studies that we take 
our cue.  
 
Remittances and Economic Voting   
One of the largest bodies of work in political science is concerned with the importance of the 
economic vote. Beginning with Downs’ (1957) classic assertion that individuals will choose 
parties to best maximize their personal utility, work in this vein has demonstrated that support 
for the incumbent is based on voter evaluations of economic performance: when economic 
performance is deemed to be good, incumbents are rewarded and when economic 
performance is deemed bad, incumbents are punished or sanctioned (e.g. Kramer 1971; 
Fiorina 1981). This economic voting model has more sophisticated variants; most notably, 
competence models, which argue that voters go beyond a reward-punishment calculus and 
instead seek to select the most competent candidate, based on expectations developed with 
the available economic data they have observed (e.g. Stigler 1973; for an overview, see Duch 
and Stevenson 2008, 12-16). For this reason, economic voting comes with significant 
normative implications. It suggests that even in low-information environments with weak 
party systems, voters can assign responsibility for economic outcomes to the actions of 
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incumbents, thereby establishing a chain of democratic accountability (Stokes 2001). In fact, 
across new democracies, evidence suggests that the economic vote is prevalent from Latin 
America (Singer 2013) to Africa (Posner and Simon 2002) to Eastern Europe (Roberts 2008).  
Voters however, are not always able to establish a coherent link between economic 
outcomes and incumbent action. Existing research shows that in developing democracies, 
support for incumbents is largely determined by economic and political developments 
abroad, such as commodity price shocks (e.g. Leigh 2009; Monteiro and Ferraz 2012). 
Focusing on Latin America for example, Campello and Zucco (2016) provide evidence that 
voters misattribute responsibility for economic outcomes to incumbents.  They develop a 
‘Good Economic Times’ index based on commodity prices and US interest rates, which are 
exogenous to the control of Latin American governments. They demonstrate that this index 
can help explain the re-election of incumbents and presidential popularity. When times are 
good, incumbents are rewarded and when times are bad, incumbents are punished.  
In many respects, remittances are an even better test of attribution in economic voting. 
Remittances are the “epitome of private transfers” (Bravo 2012, 6). They go straight into the 
hands of the individuals that receive them, often get transferred outside of formal bank 
channels, and for many countries in the world, lie largely outside of the incumbent’s control. 
For this reason, existing work considers remittances as an excellent identification strategy to 
test whether voters hold incumbents accountable for events beyond their control (Bravo 
2012). While it is possible for governments to control the inflow of remittances, mainly 
through some form of tax on remitted income, or schemes to encourage migrants to remit 
more, or through manipulation of the official exchange rate (e.g. O’Neill 2001), the 
regulation of remittances does not come cheap.1 Where taxes on remittances have been 
                                                
1 Examples of taxes on remittances include a five per cent tax on remittances in Vietnam 
(which was removed in 1997), a state cross-border tax on remittances in Tajikistan (removed 
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introduced in the past, they have tended to drive cash flows into informal channels and black-
market activity (see Mohapatra, et al. 2012) and as such, remittances are usually untaxed. For 
example, in Kyrgyzstan, the case we are interested in here, the government has not 
manipulated the exchange rate during the period covered in our data (2010-2013), it has not 
engaged in any form of remittance incentive scheme, nor has it attempted to tax remittance 
inflows (Slay 2015).  
 Focusing on remittance payments alone, an influential literature shows that they not 
only increase the general consumable income of households that receive them (e.g. Barajas et 
al. 2009), but also provide recipients with a social safety net that can insure them against 
economic shocks (Chaudhry 1997; Doyle 2015; Germano 2013; Yang and Choi 2007), 
thereby increasing their financial stability and reducing their economic grievances (Germano 
2013). The net effect of this financial stability and greater consumption power is more 
positive egocentric and sociotropic economic evaluations. In turn, recipients’ evaluations of 
the incumbent government will improve. Bravo (2012), Germano (2013) and Ahmed (2017) 
provide evidence that this is exactly what happens in Latin America. Across the Americas 
(Bravo 2012; Ahmed 2017), and in Mexican municipalities (Germano 2013), remittance 
recipients exhibit greater support for incumbents relative to non-recipients, an effect that 
operates through the positive egocentric and sociotropic economic evaluations of recipients. 
We do not take issue with these arguments. We agree that the insurance and 
consumption effects of remittances are likely to increase economic optimism and result in 
support for the incumbent. In fact, in Table 1, we broadly follow Bravo’s (2012) analysis 
                                                                                                                                                  
in 2003), an overseas document stamp tax in the Philippines (removed for workers in 1995) 
and the tax that the Indian government levies on fees from money transfer agents, but not on 
actual remittance flows (e.g. Mohapatra, et al. 2012). When Vietnam and Tajikistan removed 
their taxes on remittances, official flows significantly increased. 
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with data from 26 countries in Central Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia, drawn 
from the 2006 wave of the LiTS2 (summary statistics are provided in Section A.2 of the 
Supporting Information (SI)). With a simple dichotomous measure of whether a respondent 
receives remittances or not, two-level multilevel models presented below, demonstrate that, 
similar to Bravo’s (2012) results, financial remittances increase satisfaction with household 
(Model 1) and national (Model 2) economic conditions. The effect of remittances on trust 
towards the country’s president in Model 3 is also positive, and statistically significant. The 
effect of remittances on political evaluations in Model 4 remains robust, even after we control 
for economic satisfaction at the household, and national level (for more information see page 




















                                                
2 These countries are: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
the Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Moldova, Montenegro, FYR Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Tajikistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan.  
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Trust in the 
President  
Model (3) 
Trust in the 
President 
Model (4) 
     
Remittances   0.135*** 0.048* 0.070** 0.056* 
 (0.041) (0.027) (0.032) (0.031) 
Pocketbook     0.027*** 
    (0.005) 
Sociotropic     0.230*** 
    (0.008) 
     
Employed  0.122*** -0.019 0.026 0.028 
 (0.022) (0.015) (0.018) (0.017) 
Education  0.289*** 0.015 0.046*** 0.035*** 
 (0.018) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) 
Age  -0.005*** -0.001 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Male  -0.024 0.010 -0.041*** -0.043*** 
 (0.020) (0.013) (0.016) (0.016) 
Wealth  0.288*** 0.065*** 0.028*** 0.005 
 (0.007) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
Rural 0.026 0.039*** 0.121*** 0.112*** 
 (0.023) (0.015) (0.018) (0.018) 
Metropolitan -0.042 -0.095*** -0.139*** -0.116*** 
 (0.029) (0.019) (0.022) (0.022) 
Growth -0.026* 0.027* 0.051** 0.046** 
 (0.015) (0.014) (0.021) (0.019) 
Constant 3.419*** 2.243*** 2.325*** 1.718*** 
 (0.159) (0.147) (0.213) (0.193) 
     
     
Log Likelihood -47618 -36722 -41312 -40778  
AIC 95259 73468 82649 81585 
BIC  95357 73566 82747 81699 
Individuals  25,438 25,438 25,438 25,438 
Countries 26 26 26 26 
Notes: The table reports coefficients from hierarchical linear models (HLM) with standard errors in parentheses.  
The baseline category for settlement status (rural and metropolitan) is urban. For more information see Table 
B.1 and page 13 of the Supporting Information (SI) as well as see Tables C.1-C.3 for robustness checks. *** 
significant at p≤0.01, ** p≤.05, * p≤0.1 level. Source: EBRD Life in Transition Survey (LiTS), 2006 
 
Changes in Remittances and Incumbent Approval 
Remittances do not always reach recipient households at the same time and in the same 
amount, and changes in the frequency and value of remittances will affect the livelihood of 
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households in developing economies across the world. During periods of economic 
contraction in migrant host economies, remittance payments are likely to fall due to changing 
migration flows, currency depreciation, or efforts by migrants to cut costs (Mohapatra and 
Ratha 2010). In the midst of the global financial crisis for example, the World Bank 
estimated that remittance flows to developing countries declined by 6 per cent between 2008 
and 2009. What are the political effects of changes in remittance flows?  
 We argue that recipients who experience a decline in remittances become less 
satisfied with their economic situation, thereby undermining their support for the incumbent. 
Conversely, when remittances increase, the economic evaluations of recipients will improve, 
resulting in an increase in incumbent support. In other words, remittance recipients are 
rewarding or punishing incumbents for economic developments in migrant receiving 
economies that are largely outside of the control of politicians at home. While this may be a 
type of pocketbook voting, it also represents a form of misattribution with normative 
implications for democratic accountability in remittance dependent states. Punishing or 
rewarding incumbents for events outside their control may distort the economic vote as an 
instrument of accountability as it will undermine the direct link between government action, 
voters and electoral sanctions (Campello and Zucco 2017). For remittance receiving 
countries, incumbent approval will be subject to economic conditions in countries elsewhere. 
If countercyclical, remittances may ‘buffer’ recipients from the vagaries of the economy and 
bolster support for incumbents, but such effects could also dampen incumbent incentives to 
invest in welfare provisions (Doyle 2015) and encourage governments to divert income into 
patronage instead (Ahmed 2012). Declines in remittances, caused by downturns in economies 
abroad, may exacerbate economic grievances among the electorate and lead to poor 
evaluations of the incumbent for events not necessarily under their control. In some senses 
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then, the flow of remittances to the developing world would appear to be a political 
manifestation of economic dependency (e.g. Wibbels 2006).	  	   
Moreover, while we agree with Bravo (2012) that remittances are an excellent 
identification strategy to test how individuals attribute responsibility for shocks to their 
income and economic security, we think we can go one step further. Bravo (2012) argues that 
the bias introduced by unobserved household and individual heterogeneity is likely to bias 
results downwards, given that those who migrate are most likely to come from households 
with more negative evaluations of the incumbent and status quo.3 Our panel data allows us to 
overcome some of the potential sources of bias by employing a within-subject design. By 
limiting our analysis to remittance recipients alone, we are also able to address concerns 
regarding the unobserved differences between households that receive remittances and those 
that do not.  
 
Background and Case Selection 
 
In the ensuing sections, we provide a detailed test of whether and how fluctuations in 
remitted income affect political attitudes. We first illustrate our argument with the case of 
Kyrgyzstan. Leveraging a unique four-wave panel study of Kyrgyz citizens between 2010-
2013, the LiK surveys, we are able to carefully identify how changes in remittances affect 
variation in incumbent approval. In a second step, we turn to cross-sectional survey data from 
Central Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia, collected in the aftermath of the 
                                                
3 Of course, it is possible that in a global or regional crisis, recipients may experience a 
decline in their remitted income and still blame their government for their perceived role in 
the wider regional crisis, above and beyond any changes in their remittances.  
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Great Recession in 2008-2010. Specifically, we rely on the 2010 LiTS that includes survey 
data for 28 countries in the region.4  
Central Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and the Caucasus provide a useful context for 
exploring how fluctuations in financial remittances affect political attitudes. For many of the 
countries in the region, remittances are one of the most important sources of external 
financing after foreign direct investment. In the mid-2000s for example, financial remittances 
were equivalent to 20 per cent of GDP in Moldova, Bosnia and Herzegovina and over 10 per 
cent in Albania and Armenia. Yet, during the Great Recession of 2008-2010, the period from 
which the survey evidence we rely on is drawn, remittances became a channel through which 
the crisis was transmitted, not mitigated. The deterioration in the economy of migrant host 
countries caused official remittance flows in Central Eastern Europe and Central Asia to fall 
by 23 per cent on average (Ratha, et al. 2010). Relying on World Bank data, Figure 1 
provides an overview of how the inflow of remittances (as a percentage of GDP) fluctuated 
between 2008 and 2009 in the region. 
 
                                                
4 The countries included in the analysis are: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, 
Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Montenegro, FYR Macedonia, Poland, 
Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. 
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Notes: The Figure shows changes in the share of personal remittances received as a percentage of a country’s 
overall GDP between 2008 and 2009.  Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators. 
 
Figure 1 Fluctuations in remittances inflow (as percentage of GDP) between 2008 and 2009  
 
The Kyrgyz economy is one of the most remittance-dependent economies in the 
world. From 2011 to 2014, the flows of financial remittances were as large as about one-third 
of the country’s GDP (World Bank 2017). At the aggregate level, workers’ remittances, 
which represent the most important financing flow in the country’s balance of payments, 
have covered a large part of the national trade and budget deficits. In just three years for 
example, Kyrgyzstan’s budget deficit dropped from 13.7 per cent of GDP in 2008 to 6.4 per 
cent in 2011 (International Monetary Fund 2016).  
At the same time, dependence on remittances exposes the Kyrgyz economy to 
developments abroad, especially in Russia, where the largest share of the country’s migrant 
population seeks employment. It is estimated for example, that about 97 per cent of all 
remittance flows to Kyrgyzstan originate from the Russian Federation. When remittance 
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outflows from Russia to the Commonwealth of Independent States dropped by 33 per cent 
during the first three quarters of 2009, Kyrgyzstan was one of the first countries to experience 
the consequences (Mohapatra and Ratha 2010). According to World Bank estimates, in 2009, 
some Central Asian (Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan) and Eastern European countries 
(Romania, Moldova) experienced reductions of one half, to one third, of their 2008 
remittance levels. This decline in remitted income recovered, before worsening again. The 
overall flow of remittances from Russia increased from 1008 million US Dollars in 2010 to 
1759.7 million in 2013, before suffering another drop due to the depreciation of the Russian 
currency in 2014. Figure 2, which relies on evidence from the World Bank Development 
Indicators, summarizes these trends, showing how the remittances that Kyrgyzstan received 
(as a percentage of the country’s GDP) fluctuated during the period 2002-2015.  
 
Notes: The Figure shows fluctuations in the share of remittances received in Kyrgyzstan as a percentage of the 
country’s GDP in the 2002-2015 period. Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators. 
 
Figure 2 Personal remittances received (as percentage of GDP) in Kyrgyzstan, 2002 – 2015	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In the time-period covered in the LiK surveys between 2010 and 2013, the Kyrgyz 
economy experienced a period of stable growth. Across all four years, Kyrgyzstan’s GDP 
was around 6 billion US Dollars. During the period under analysis, the Kyrgyz government 
did not engage in any policy to either limit or control migration, nor any policy to actively 
encourage remittances and investment in Kyrgyzstan, such as diaspora bonds. The Kyrgyz 
government has never implemented a formal tax on remittances, while the official exchange 
rate is allowed to float freely (Slay 2015). In the second half of 2014, the Central Bank did 
use official reserves to prop up the Som-US Dollar exchange rate, which caused an 
appreciation of the Som against the Ruble. This led to an appreciating and overvalued Som-
Ruble rate and given 90 per cent of remittances to Kyrgyzstan come from Russia, this had a 
deleterious effect on remittance inflows (Slay 2015). However, this occurred after the period 
covered by our panel (2010-2013). In fact, during the period of our panel remittance inflows 
actually increased. What is more, the increasing use of technology, such as mobile and 
internet transfers, is making it even more difficult for governments to exert control over 
remittance inflows (Vieira 2017). As such, we think it reasonable to suggest that remittances 
are largely exogenous in the case of Kyrgyzstan as the Kyrgyz government was not actively 
manipulating or controlling remittance inflows. 
The period covered in the LiK surveys captures important variation in political 
developments. In 2010, President Bakiyev was violently overthrown and vicious inter-ethnic 
clashes escalated across the country. Violent riots in the spring of 2010 were associated with 
a collapse in trust in government institutions. According to evidence from the 2010 LiTS 
survey, Kyrgyzstan ranked in the bottom ten of transition countries in terms of trust in the 
President and the national government (EBRD 2010, 83). Yet, during the same year, 
Kyrgyzstan adopted a new constitution, and held the most free and fair election contest that 
took place in Central Asia on record (Freedom House 2010). The new leadership undertook 
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reforms to liberalize the political system, combat corruption, and the country enjoyed a 
period of relative stability as its new parliamentary system began to function. A new election 
held in 2011 brought president Atambayev to power with an impressive 63 per cent of the 
vote. Although over the 2010-2012 period the Kyrgyz parliament produced four different 
ruling coalitions, reforms to combat corruption were introduced. The level of corruption in 
Kyrgyzstan declined significantly since the ousting of former president Bakiyev (Freedom 
House 2014). The stable growth that the Kyrgyz economy experienced since 2010, and 
political renewal in the years covered in the surveys, stacks the deck against finding declines 
in incumbent trust and support over the 2010 to 2013 period under investigation here. 
 
The Life in Kyrgyzstan Surveys  
The first part of the analysis relies on panel survey data from the 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013 
waves of the LiK survey (Brück et al. 2014). The survey tracks the same 3,000 households in 
all seven Kyrgyz oblasts (regions) and the two cities of Bishkek and Osh. The data are 
representative at both the national and regional level. 81.6 per cent of all 3000 households 
identified in the original sample in 2010 participated in all four waves. We restrict our sample 
to adults only (for more information on the LiK survey see section A1 of the SI). In 2010, 
10.1 per cent of households received financial remittances, 12.3 per cent in 2011, 12.5 per 
cent in 2012 and 12.3 per cent in 2013. Households received their remitted income in four 
different currencies across the waves: 54.2 per cent of households received remittances in 
Kyrgyz Som, 39.6 per cent in Russian Rubles, 5.5 per cent in US Dollars, and 0.7 per cent in 
Euros. Given that we are interested in the political consequences of fluctuations in 
remittances, our analyses focus on remittance recipients only. Between 2010 and 2011, 67.3 
per cent of remittance recipients experienced a change in the amount or frequency of money 
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received, 63.6 per cent experienced a change between 2012 and 2011, and 63.1 per cent 
between 2012 and 2013.  
 We explore the political effects of fluctuations in remittances by relying on three 
different measures: 1) changes in the amount of remitted income received between survey 
waves, 2) changes in the frequency of remittances received between survey waves, and 3) 
changes in a Remittance Index that combines information about both the amount and 
regularity of remittances (Germano 2010). By moving beyond a simple dichotomous measure 
of receiving remittances or not, these measures allow us to capture important variation in the 
dynamics of remittance flows.  
Our first measure captures changes in the amount of remitted income across the 
different survey waves. It relies on respondents’ answers to two survey questions. First, 
respondents were asked: ‘During the last 12 months, did you receive any money from abroad 
sent by migrants who are members of this household?’ Second, respondents who indicated 
that they received money sent by migrants were asked ‘How much money did household 
migrants send over the last 12 months?’ The variable Change in Amount of Remittances t-(t-1) 
subtracts the amount of money received in wave t-1 from the amount of money received at 
wave t for each respondent. It therefore captures the change in the amount of remitted income 
received by each respondent between survey waves. Respondents were asked to report the 
amount of money in the currency in which they received it, that is to say Kyrgyz Som, 
Russian Rubles, US Dollars, or Euros. In order to ensure that the magnitude of changes in the 
amount of remitted income are comparable, we transferred all amounts into Kyrgyz Som by 
using the average exchange rate over the year (for more detailed information see Table A.4 of 
the SI). The variable Change in Amount of Remittances t-(t-1) varies between -23.4 and 35.7, 
i.e. from 234 to 357 thousand Som. With the 2010-2013 average Som to US Dollar exchange 
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rate, these changes approximately vary between a maximum decrease of 5 and maximum 
increase of 8 thousand US Dollars respectively. 
Our second measure captures the changes in the frequency with which respondents 
receive remittances across survey waves. It relies on respondents’ answers to the following 
survey question: ‘How many times within the last 12 months did migrants send/bring 
money?’ This question was asked only to those respondents who indicated that they received 
money from migrants abroad over the last 12 months. Respondents were given six answer 
categories: ‘1) once, 2) 2-3 times, 3) 4-5 times, 4) 6-10 times, 5) 11-12 times, and 6) more 
than 12 times.’ The variable Change in Frequency of Remittances t-(t-1) subtracts the 
frequency with which remittances were received in wave t-1 from the frequency in wave t for 
each respondent. Hence, the variable captures the change in the frequency with which 
respondents received remittances from abroad between each survey wave. The variable 
Change in Frequency of Remittances t-(t-1) ranges from a minimum value of -5) to a maximum 
value of 5). 
Our third measure relies on changes in a Remittance Index. This index taps into the 
degree to which remittances are a substantial and reliable source of income. While the 
continuous measures of remittances used here are an improvement on categorical measures, 
they might not capture the extent to which these financial flows constitute a substantial and 
reliable source of income. To overcome some of these issues, Germano (2010) developed the 
Remittance Index comprised of three components: the amount, the regularity and the duration 
of remittances received. The index thus captures “the extent to which remittances are a 
substantial, reliable, and enduring source of income to the household” (Germano 2010, 153). 
The LiK survey allows us to capture both the amount and regularity of remittances across all 
waves. Specifically, we rely on respondents’ answers to the following questions: ‘How much 
money did household migrants send over the last 12 months?’ for the amount, and ‘Did you 
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receive the money sent by migrants always at the same point of time (is the receiving of 
money regular)?’ for regularity. Regarding the amount of remittances, we recoded the 
amount received (in Som) into three categories: 1) those that received amounts ranging 
between the minimum and mean value in the respective survey wave, 2) those that received 
amounts between the mean and one standard deviation above the mean value in the 
respective survey wave, and 3) those that received amounts larger than one standard 
deviation above the mean value in the respective survey wave. Regarding the regularity of 
remittances, respondents could choose between the following answer categories: ‘1) yes, 2) 
no or 3) different (varies)’. We recoded the answer in the following way: 1) no, 2) different 
and 3) yes. In keeping with Germano (2010), we added both measures to a Remittance Index 
that takes on a minimum value of 1) and a maximum value of 6) (for more information on the 
construction of the Remittance Index see Table A.5 of the SI). We constructed the variable 
Change in Remittance Index t-(t-1) that subtracts the value of the index in wave t-1 from the 
value of the index in wave t for each respondent. The variable Change in Remittance Index t-
(t-1) ranges from a minimum value of -5 to a maximum value of 5. 
 In addition, we construct a dichotomous measure of declines in remitted income, 
Reduction in Remittances. This variable takes on a value of 1) when respondents experienced 
a reduction in the amount and/or frequency of remitted income, and 0) if they did not. This 
dichotomous measure allows us to compare the effect of experiencing a reduction in 
remittances to other household income shocks that respondents were asked about in the 
Kyrgyz survey, and to check the robustness of our results against matching analyses. 
Our main dependent variable asks respondents how much they generally trust the 
president. Relying on this item, we construct a variable, presidential trust, which ranges from 
1) to 4), with higher values denoting greater trust in the president. In line with other work, we 
use trust in the incumbent, here the president, as a proxy of incumbent approval (e.g. 
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Williams 1985, Ahmed 2017).5 Based on this measure we construct a variable Change in 
Trust in the President t-(t-1) by subtracting the trust in the president at wave t-1 from trust in 
the president at wave t. This variable ranges from a minimum value of -3) and a maximum 
value of 3). Overall, we expect to find a positive effect for a change in the amount and the 
frequency of remittances received or in the Remittance Index, and a negative effect for 
reductions in remittances on change in trust in the president.  
The analyses also include a set of control variables, including gender, age, education, 
marital status, ethnicity, intention to migrate, life satisfaction and attitude to risk. Controlling 
for ethnicity in the context of Kyrgyzstan is important as ethnicity captures one of the most 
salient political divides in the country. It serves somewhat as a proxy for partisanship in a 
context with a traditionally weak party system, and where ethnic and clan divisions are very 
important (Fumagalli 2016). We also control for other sources of income or wealth, such as 
being in paid employment, household income and a wealth index. Summary statistics of all 
variables used in the analysis of the LiK data and question wordings are provided in Tables 
A.2-A.3 of the SI. 
Our dataset pools observations for respondents nested in households across the four 
different waves. To deal with both the temporal and nested data, we employ two different 
estimation strategies. First, we perform a panel data generalized least squares (GLS) 
estimation with household and panel wave fixed effects as well as random effects varying 
across individuals. Second, we use a hierarchical linear model (HLM) to deal with the fact 
that individuals are nested in households and waves (Snijders and Bosker 2012). We estimate 
a model consisting of two levels, one is the respondent level and the other is a 
                                                
5 In the LiTS II survey of 2010, measures of trust are highly correlated with evaluations of 
government performance. The bivariate correlation between government approval and trust in 
the national government is 0.5, statistically significant at the 0.001 level.  
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household*wave level. The HLM results are reported in Tables C.4, C.8 and C.11 in the SI. 
In both estimations, we regress changes in trust in the president on changes in remittances. To 
check the robustness of our results, we also employ nearest neighbor matching (NN 
matching) based on our dichotomous measure of a decline in remittances. These results are 
reported in Tables C.6, C.7, C.10, C.13 and C.14 of the SI, and show that the effect of 
remittances remain robust even when we match respondents on a series of covariates that 
could predict their susceptibility to experiencing a decline in remittances in the first place. 
 
Results  
Models 1 through 3 in Table 2 explore the relationship between changes in remittances and 
changes in incumbent support. The dependent variable in Models 1 and 3 is the difference in 
levels of trust in the President across survey waves, while our measure of changes in 
remittances differs across models. Model 1 shows the results for changes in the amount of 
remitted income, Model 2 the results for changes in the frequency with which respondents 
receive remittances, and Model 3 the results for changes in our index. All results are based on 
a panel data model that accounts for repeated observations of individuals and includes both 
household and survey wave fixed effects. The results show that an increase in remittances 
coincides with an increase in trust in the president, while a decrease in remittances decreases 
trust in the president. For example, when a respondent experiences a change in remitted 
income from the minimum to maximum amount, trust in the president increases by 2.8 points 
on a six-point scale. These results are robust against different ways to measure changes in 
remitted income, different estimation methods and different model specifications (see Tables 
C.4-C.7 in the SI).  
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Table 2: Changes in remittances and changes in trust in the president, Kyrgyzstan panel data 
 Change in Trust in President t-(t-1) 
COVARIATES Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
Change in Amount of 0.048**   
Remittances t-(t-1) (0.019)   
    
Change in Frequency of  0.070**  
Remittances t-(t-1)  (0.032)  
    
Change in Remittances   0.064*** 
Index t-(t-1)   (0.023) 
    
Primary Education 0.252 0.294 0.242 
 (0.412) (0.411) (0.412) 
Secondary Education 0.421 0.433 0.423 
 (0.397) (0.396) (0.397) 
University Education 0.512 0.524 0.524 
 (0.432) (0.430) (0.432) 
Gender -0.031 -0.026 -0.031 
 (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) 
Age 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Married -0.042 -0.075 -0.060 
 (0.110) (0.110) (0.110) 
Ethnicity 0.121 0.142 0.147 
 (0.502) (0.500) (0.502) 
Employed -0.014 -0.058 -0.032 
 (0.111) (0.111) (0.110) 
Intention to Migrate -0.047 -0.078 -0.085 
 (0.174) (0.173) (0.174) 
Wealth Index -0.014 -0.009 -0.012 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Household Income -0.001** -0.001 -0.0005* 
 (0.0003) (0.000) (0.0003) 
Life Satisfaction 0.070*** 0.064** 0.069*** 
 (0.024) (0.025) (0.024) 
Risk Attitude 0.023 0.019 0.026 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Constant 0.274 0.218 0.247 
 (1.065) (1.060) (1.063) 
Fixed Effects    
       Household ✓ ✓ ✓ 
       Survey Wave ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Observations (Individuals, 1,287 1,273 1,287 
Groups) 866 864 866 
R2  Between 0.59 0.58 0.59 
Notes: Models 1 through 3 present regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses based on a panel 
GLS estimation with random effects varying across individuals and household and wave fixed effects. Being 
illiterate is the reference category for education. For robustness check, see Tables C.4-C.7 of the SI. Significant 
at the *** p≤0.01, ** p≤0.05, * p≤0.10 level. Source: Life in Kyrgyzstan Panel Survey, 2010-2013.  
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Still we might be concerned that changes in the Kyrgyz economy could be driving 
both the changes in remittances and incumbent approval. To deal with this concern, we 
employ an instrumental variables (IV) regression. As an instrument, we use annual change in 
unemployment in Russia, the major destination country for Kyrgyz migrants, interacted with 
(or weighted by) the share of women in each household. The share of female household 
members is a key household level characteristic correlated with the receipt and amount of 
remittances, but not with incumbent approval. The instrument we employ incorporates the 
idea, common in previous studies, that growth in the migrant host country is likely to be a 
key driver of remittances (e.g. Barajas et al. 2009; Singer, 2012). The results, which are 
reported in Table D.1 of the SI, show that remittance effects on approval remain robust, even 
when we instrument remittance amounts using annual changes in unemployment in Russia 
weighted by the share of women in the household.  
Before turning to the analysis of the mechanism driving the connection between 
changes in remittances and approval, we investigate how a decline in remittances stacks up 
against other shocks that individuals face. We do so by comparing the effect of experiencing 
a reduction in remittances on incumbent approval against the effects of other adverse income 
shocks that individuals may experience, such as the effect of having suffered a loss in 
agricultural income or being affected by landslides. Respondents in the LiK surveys were 
asked if they had suffered agricultural loss, for example through diseases in crop or livestock, 
or were affected by a landslide. The variables Reduction in Remittances, Agricultural Loss 
and Affected by Landslides take on a value of 1) when respondents experienced this kind of 
shock and a value of 0) if not. While 28.2 per cent of respondents who received remittances 
across the four waves stated that they had experienced a decline in remittances, 12.7 per cent 
reported that they lost income due to agricultural loss, and 11.6 per cent were adversely 
affected by landslides. We regress changes in trust in the president on these household 
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income shocks, while controlling for the full set of covariates introduced in Table 2. Full 
results are reported in Table B.2 in the SI. Figure 3 graphically displays the size of the 
effects. Importantly, the figure shows that the effect of a reduction in remittances is of similar 
size to the effect of a landslide or agricultural loss. This underscores the importance of 
reductions in remittances for incumbent approval. 
 
 
Notes: The figure presents regression coefficients and 95 per cent confidence intervals based on a panel GLS 
estimation with random effects varying across individuals and household and wave fixed effects. Full results are 
reported in Table B.2 of the SI and robustness checks in Tables C.8-C.10. Source: Life in Kyrgyzstan Panel 
Survey, 2010-2013.  
 
Figure 3: The effect of household shocks on trust in the president 
 
 
Our argument suggests that recipients who experience a decline in remittances become less 
satisfied with their economic situation, thereby undermining their support for the incumbent. 
Conversely, when remittances increase, the economic evaluations of recipients will improve, 
resulting in more support for the incumbent. To test this mechanism with LiK data, we rely 
on respondents’ answers to the following question ‘When you think about your own 
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economic situation, how worried are you about it?’ The answer categories vary from 0) ‘not 
worried at all’ to 10) ‘extremely worried.’ We capture changes in concerns about their 
personal economic situation by subtracting their answers in wave t-1 from their answers in 
wave t for each respondent.  
Table 3 presents the results of regressing changes in concern about one’s own 
economic situation on changes in remittances, using our three different measures of 
fluctuations and a panel data model that accounts for repeated observations of individuals and 
includes both household and survey wave fixed effects. The results suggest that respondents 
who experienced an increase in the amount of remitted income (Model 1), the frequency with 
which they receive remittances (Model 2) or in the Remittance Index (Model 3) are indeed 
less worried about their own economic situation. When a respondent experiences a change in 
remitted income from the minimum to maximum amount, concern about her own economic 
situation decreases by 9.55 points on a twenty-point scale. These effects are robust across 
different estimation methods and model specifications (see Tables C.11-C.13 of the SI). 
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Table 3: Changes in remittances and concern about personal economic situation, Kyrgyzstan 
panel data  
 Change in Concern about Personal Economic Situation t-(t-1) 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
Change in Amount of -0.162***   
Remittances t-(t-1) (0.045)   
    
Change in Frequency of  -0.245***  
Remittances t-(t-1)  (0.077)  
    
Change in Remittances   -0.141** 
Index t-(t-1)   (0.055) 
    
Primary Education 0.724 0.731 0.728 
 (0.985) (0.982) (0.988) 
Secondary Education 0.444 0.454 0.423 
 (0.953) (0.949) (0.956) 
University Education -0.028 -0.030 -0.098 
 (1.035) (1.032) (1.038) 
Gender 0.033 0.037 0.034 
 (0.176) (0.177) (0.177) 
Age -0.001 -0.001 -0.009 
 (0.007) (0.001) (0.007) 
Married 0.174 0.277 0.223 
 (0.262) (0.262) (0.263) 
Ethnicity -0.155 -0.231 -0.203 
 (1.203) (1.198) (1.207) 
Employed 0.292 0.357 0.343 
 (0.264) (0.266) (0.265) 
Intention to Migrate -0.762 -0.654 -0.669 
 (0.415) (0.413) (0.416) 
Wealth Index 0.052 0.018 0.044 
 (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) 
Household Income -0.0004 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Life Satisfaction -0.053 -0.037 -0.040 
 (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) 
Risk Attitude 0.027 0.024 0.020 
 (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) 
Constant -3.146 -2.776 -3.060 
 (2.553) (2.544) (2.561) 
Fixed Effects    
       Household ✓ ✓ ✓ 
       Survey Wave ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Observations (Individuals 1,297 1,283 1,297 
Groups) 877 875 877 
R2 Between 0.65 0.64 0.64 
Notes: Models 1 through 3 present regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses based on a panel 
GLS estimation with random effects varying across individuals and household and wave fixed effects. Being 
illiterate is the reference category for education. For robustness check, see Tables C.11-C.13 of the SI. 
Significant at the *** p≤0.01, ** p≤0.05, * p≤0.10 level. Source: Life in Kyrgyzstan Panel Survey, 2010-2013.  
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Cross sectional survey data  
To bolster the external validity of the findings from Kyrgyzstan and probe the mechanism 
further, we turn to the 2010 LiTS survey, which includes data from 28 countries in Central 
Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia. Respondents were asked if they were 
adversely financially affected since the crisis (‘over the last two years’), and what the source 
was: a) ‘head of household lost job’, b) ‘other household member lost job’, c) ‘family 
business closed’, d) ‘working hours reduced’, e) ‘wages delayed/suspended’, f) ‘wages 
reduced’, g) ‘reduced flow of remittances’, h) ‘family member returned home from abroad’ or 
i) ‘other’. We are interested in those who report experiencing a reduced flow in remittances, 
and construct a variable, Reduction in Remittances, which is coded as 1) if respondents state 
that they experienced a decline in remittances and 0) if they experienced another economic 
household shock..  
In order to examine the effect of a decline in remitted income on approval, we rely on 
an item asking respondents ‘to rate the overall performance of the national government’ from 
1) ‘very bad’ to 5) ‘very good’. To test our misattribution argument, we also examine if those 
who experienced a decline in remitted income are also more likely to blame the incumbent 
for the crisis compared to those who experienced a shock due to other sources, such as a job 
loss or wage reduction. This is arguably a conservative test of our argument as we are only 
examining those who have experienced an economic household shock and comparing those 
for whom the shock was due to a decrease in remitted income originating from outside the 
country to those for whom the shock in income was based on a change stemming from the 
national economy. At the individual level, we control for other sources of income or wealth, 
such as being in paid employment and house ownership, as well as age and education. At the 
country level, we control for macro-economic performance using a growth indicator. 
Descriptive statistics are provided in Table A.6 of the SI.  
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Because of the natural hierarchies in the data (individuals who are nested in 
countries), we employ a HLM regression analysis. Table 4 reports the results. The analysis 
presented in Model 1 suggests that evaluations of government performance are lower among 
respondents who experienced a decline in remittances, compared to those otherwise affected 
by the recession. Results reported in Model 2 suggest that holding all covariates at their 
means, respondents who experience a decline in remittances are, by approximately 8 per cent, 
more likely than respondents otherwise affected by the Great Recession to blame the national 
government for the downturn.  Conversely, respondents with access to a more robust 
portfolio of assets are less likely to blame the national government for the crisis. The 
marginal effect of the wealth index on blame attributions is around 7 per cent. Lastly, the 
growth indicator also behaves in the anticipated way. Evaluations of incumbent performance 
are higher in countries with higher growth, while blame attribution is lower. Overall, the 
evidence presented in Table 4 corroborates our results from the Kyrgyz sample. People who 
experience a reduction in remitted income are less likely to be satisfied with the 
government’s record and more likely to blame the government for a deterioration of 
economic conditions. Altogether, the evidence suggests remittances can drive fluctuations in 
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Table 4: A reduction in remittances on government approval and economic blame attribution 
Notes: Table entries are HLM regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses for model 1 and HLM 
logistic regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses for model 2. In both models individuals are 
nested in countries. For robustness checks see Table C.15 in the SI. Significant at the *** p≤0.01, ** p≤0.05, * 
p≤0.10 level. Source: Life in Transition Survey, 2010.  
 
Evaluating the Mechanism 
In the previous sections, we have theoretically argued and empirically demonstrated that 
changes in remittances drive fluctuations in economic assessments and evaluations of the 
incumbent. We have also suggested that this relationship can be understood as a form of 
misattribution, in the sense that voters are rewarding or punishing incumbents for economic 
developments originating from elsewhere. While this behavior is rational, particularly in a 




 Model (1) Model (2) 
Reduction in Remittances  -0.038** 0.079* 
 (0.018) (0.043) 
Age  0.001*** -0.003*** 
 (0.0005) (0.001) 
Gender  -0.069*** -0.043 
 (0.014) (0.032) 
Married  -0.008 0.095*** 
 (0.014) (0.033) 
Employed  0.027* -0.026 
 (0.015) (0.035) 
Wealth Index  -0.004 -0.073*** 
 (0.004) (0.010) 
Education  -0.011 -0.048* 
 (0.012) (0.027) 
Life Satisfaction  0.165*** -0.141*** 
 (0.007) (0.015) 
Risk Attitude  -0.001 -0.003 
 (0.003) (0.007) 
Annual Growth  0.101*** -0.122*** 
 (0.021) (0.041) 
Constant 2.008*** 0.798*** 
 (0.096) (0.197) 
Log Likelihood  -22444 -12323 
AIC 44914.45 24670.72 
BIC 45015.38 24765.37 
   
Individuals  17,389 19,684 
Countries  28 28 
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context where economic performance is largely driven by exogenous shocks, it has 
implications for the economic vote as an instrument of accountability (e.g. Campello and 
Zucco 2017).  
 There may be another mechanism at work here however, where households update 
their evaluations of incumbent competence, because they think the incumbent facilitates, or 
hinders remittance transfers. If that were the case, we would expect that fluctuations in 
remittances should exclusively influence support for the president, or central government 
authorities. Yet, as we show in Table D.2 in the SI, fluctuations in remittances also influence 
support for local community leaders. Arguably, it is unlikely that local community leaders 
could manipulate remittance inflows, or that voters would expect them to, as they lack the 
authority to manipulate the official exchange rate or to introduce schemes to encourage 
migrants to remit more.  
In a similar vein, one could argue that households affected by a decline in remittances 
are holding incumbents accountable for either failing to prevent declines in remittances, 
and/or for failing to ‘treat’ the welfare consequences of the decline. As Ashworth, Bueno de 
Mesquita and Friedenberg (2018) have argued, even exogenous shocks provide an 
opportunity for voters to learn new information about an incumbent. Here the change in 
remittances would be such a shock, and the ability of the government to respond to this shock 
or their preparedness to compensate its consequences could give voters new information 
about the incumbent (e.g. Acevedo 2016). As such, voters who experience a decline in 
remittances may disapprove of the incumbent not because of a mechanism underpinned by 
misattribution, but one rooted in an increased need for national public services. If this were 
the case, voters could be punishing governments for their response to the exogenous shock, 
rather than for the decline in remittances. This is what we call the treatment responsibility 
mechanism (Javeline 2003). 
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Can we separate out these different mechanisms from our results? Although given the 
observational nature of our data we cannot be definitive, based on three points that we 
discuss below, we believe that the weight of evidence is more strongly in line with the 
misattribution mechanism. To begin with, in our analysis of changes in incumbent approval, 
we relied on a continuous measure of changes in remittances (see Table 2). The evidence 
suggested that while decreases in remittances coincided with a decline in trust in the 
president, increases in remittances led to an increase in trust in the president. While it would 
make sense that recipients would punish governments for a lack of preparedness when 
remittances decline, rewarding governments when remittances increase is probably not 
suggestive of this mechanism. It is not clear what recipients would be rewarding the 
government for post facto, or how this would translate into new information. Unlike the 
situation with a sharp decline in remittances, which could be considered an exogenous shock, 
and recipients can infer new information from the degree of government preparedness 
because they actively seek something from the government, in the case of increases in 
remittances, recipients are not seeking compensation from the government and hence the 
extent of government preparedness will remain unobserved. As such, evidence that 
fluctuations in remittances ameliorate trust would seem to be an example of misattribution. 
Second, we find little empirical support for the argument that households that experience 
a decline in remittances become less satisfied with public safety nets, in the form of welfare 
provision or public goods. When remittances decline, as Acevedo (2016) has suggested, 
recipients may actually increase their demand for public safety nets and if the quality of 
public services disappoint, a recipient who experiences a reduction in remittances might 
sanction an incumbent to a greater degree than someone who has not experienced such a 
decline. In the 2013 wave of the LiK survey, respondents were asked how satisfied they are 
with the public services in the country. The answer categories ranged from 1) ‘very 
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dissatisfied’ to 4) ‘very satisfied’. We regressed people’s satisfaction with public service 
provision on our three different measures of changes in remittances, and the results are 
presented in Table D.3 in the SI (for robustness checks see Table D.4). We find no 
relationship between changes in remitted income and satisfaction with public service 
provision. 
The existence of Hometown Associations (HTAs), organizations that allow migrants from 
the same region to financially support development projects in their city or region of origin 
and which are very common in the Americas, would actually bias the results of our 
regressions downward, given their primary activity of supporting local health and education 
projects (Orozco and Rouse 2013). In general however, such groups are not active in 
Kyrgyzstan or in our larger sample.6 Moreover, analysis relying on evidence from the LiTS 
surveys suggests that satisfaction with welfare provisions does not moderate attributions of 
responsibility for declines in remittances (see Table D.5 in the SI). 
Next, we examine whether political information, which is crucial for blame attribution 
(e.g. Gomez and Wilson 2001; De Vries and Giger 2014), moderates the relationship between 
remittances and support for the president. Based on the treatment responsibility mechanism, 
one would expect those who are most informed to be most likely to sanction the incumbent. 
Those who are more informed are more likely to have developed some pre-shock evaluation 
of the government. As a result, they are also more likely to be able to use the information 
from the incumbent’s response to an exogenous shock to update their post-shock assessment 
of this incumbent. The opposite should hold for the misattribution mechanism. People with 
more political information should be better able to identify the merits of incumbent 
performance and thus reward or punish the incumbent less for changes in remittances. 
                                                
6 Of the 28 countries in the 2010 LiTS Survey, only Moldova and Albania appear to have 
active HTAs.  
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Although in a volatile economic environment like Kyrgyzstan, the competency signal is 
small, and it may still be rational to hold the incumbent to account for economic performance 
driven by exogenous events, those who are more informed are less likely to do so because 
they realize that the incumbent is not responsible for changes in remitted income.  
We examine these expectations by regressing changes in trust in the president on 
changes in the amount of remitted income received, as we do in Table 2, but interact the 
changes in the amount of remitted income with people’s access to political information. We 
capture access to political information by relying on a set of questions asking respondents if 
they consult different news sources, such as radio, TV or the internet, or rely on family or 
friends to learn about the situation in their community, Kyrgyzstan or the world. We create an 
additive scale ranging from 1) to 4), where 1) indicates that they use none or only one of 
these sources and 4) indicates that they rely on four or more. Figure 4 shows the marginal 
effect of changes in the amount of remitted income for people at different levels of political 
information (full results are presented in Table B.3 and robustness checks in Table C.16 and 
Figure C.1 in the SI). The results suggest that attribution of responsibility for changes in 
remittances is declining as political sophistication increases.  These findings are largely in 
line with the misattribution mechanism. 
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Notes: The figure presents the marginal effect of changes in the amount of remittances on changes in trust in the 
president at different levels of access to political information with 95 per cent confidence intervals based on a 
panel GLS estimation with random effects varying across individuals and household and wave fixed effects. For 
full results see Table B.3 and for robustness checks see Table C.15 and Figure C.1 in the SI. Source: Life in 
Kyrgyzstan Panel Survey, 2010-2013.  
 
Figure 4: The effect on changes in remittances on changes in trust in the president by access 
to political information 
 
Conclusion  
Remittances are now one of the largest flows of capital to developing world economies, in 
some cases, outstripping FDI, portfolio capital and overseas development assistance and for 
many households, they represent a crucial economic lifeline.  In this study, we contribute to 
an emerging literature concerned with the effect of remittances on individual political 
attitudes and political behavior (Meseguer et al. 2016; Germano 2013; Bravo 2012; Ahmed 
2017). Taking our cue from recent work on the relationship between remittances and the 
economic vote (Germano 2010; Bravo 2012) and on misattribution and economic voting in 
the developing world (Campello and Zucco 2016), we argued that when remittances change, 
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recipients will attribute the change in their economic situation to the incumbent. We are able 
to identify this mechanism by modeling changes in remittances on changes in economic 
evaluations and support for the incumbent using a unique four-wave panel study of Kyrgyz 
citizens between 2010-2013. We supplemented this data with cross-national survey evidence 
from 28 countries from 2010.  
 We believe that our findings are important for a number of different bodies of work. 
First, we know little about the political effects of remittances. While there is a growing 
literature on the effect of remittances on public policy at the macro level (e.g. Abdih et al. 
2012; Tyburski 2012; Aparicio and Meseguer 2012; Singer 2012; Pfutze 2014; O’Mahony 
2013; Ahmed 2012; Escribà-Folch et al. 2015; Leblang 2017), only a handful of studies have 
examined how the receipt of remittances might condition the economic vote at the individual 
level (Bravo 2012; Germano 2012; Ahmed 2017). So far, no work has explored the dynamics 
of remittances. Our study is the first study to explore how changes in remittances at the 
individual level might affect changes in incumbent support.  
 Second, our findings suggest that while the receipt of remittances does indeed bolster 
support for the incumbent all else equal as existing work suggests, this works to the 
incumbent’s disadvantage when remittances decline. Remittances are not a constant and they 
generate dynamic attitudes and political behavior in response to their own dynamism. Our 
findings may account for some of the conflicting evidence in the literature thus far. Some 
empirical work suggests that remittances can prolong the stability of authoritarian regimes 
(Ahmed 2012) while other work shows that they might hinder longevity (Escribà-Folch et al. 
2015). This study suggests that in order to better understand the relationship between 
remittances and regime longevity it is crucial to consider fluctuations in the volume and 
frequency of remittances.  
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 Our ability to model these types of changes in remittance flows, thanks to the four-
wave panel study from Kyrgyzstan, will also be relevant for work on competence models in 
economic voting (e.g. Stigler 1973; Duch and Stevenson 2008; Campello and Zucco 2016). 
This work has focused on ascertaining in what contexts voters might be able to parse out the 
difference between economic outcomes driven by the competence of their leaders, compared 
to economic outcomes driven by exogenous global forces. One of the big issues facing this 
work has been the identification of misattribution effects (Campello and Zucco 2016). 
Remittances, given they are largely a private fiscal transfer shaped by economic conditions 
elsewhere, are a particularly neat way to test misattribution. Although exogenous shocks may 
be the only source of information about incumbent competence for rational voters in volatile 
contexts, the type of misattribution we examine here will still have implications for the 
economic vote as a mechanism of accountability and as such, it will have important 
normative ramifications.  
From a more general perspective, we think this point highlights the precarious 
equilibrium that remittances can generate. When evaluations of the government at home 
respond to fluctuations in remitted income, largely driven by events and developments 
abroad, accountability mechanisms, which are rudimentary in many remittance-dependent 
economies could erode even further. When countercyclical (Yang and Choi 2007), 
remittances could bolster trust in incumbents even when economic performance at home is 
poor. They may also encourage governments to reduce social safety nets and increase 
patronage (Ahmed 2012). On the other hand, declines in remittances, and related economic 
grievances among recipients, may result in greater electoral punishment for events 
incumbents do not fully control.  
 There are still some puzzles to unravel. We still need to explore how changes in 
remittances might channel egocentric and sociotropic evaluations in different ways and what 
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this might mean for incumbent support. We were constrained by our data in this respect. We 
also need to further explore the mechanisms underlying the political consequences of 
fluctuations in remittances. Based on the observational data at our disposal here, the 
empirical evidence seems largely suggestive of a misattribution mechanism. Nonetheless, we 
think a fruitful avenue of future research would be to try to disentangle the difference 
between the misattribution and treatment responsibility mechanisms through carefully 
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